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IXTEr.LECTUAT. INTEGRITY AND THE ART
OE THINKING
RV VICTOR S. VARKOS
CROCI*!, the distinguished Itahan i)hil()sopher, maintains in one
of his books that there is no such thing' as an intellectual error.
The average man has talked for ages of mistakes of the head and
mistakes of the heart, hut Croce asserts that all mistakes are essen-
tiall}' moral.
This, at hrst siglit, a])i)ears to he a wild ])arado.\. Is it not
notorious that the most careful, conscientious and truthful men
make mistakes? Are not men misled b\- apperances, b\- ex'idence
which seems to them sufficient hut turns out e\'entuall\' to have been
insullicient ? Are not hypotheses and theories revised and re-revised
in the light of new facts, and is it not legitimate to form tentative
theories ? Now, then can Croce take the position he does as to the
origin and nature of error?
The answer is that Croce believes, with Prof. Graham Wallas
and others, that there is an art of thinking, and that it is one's dutv
to undergo training and discipline in that art, and to master it, f/iiis
ai'oidiiu; errors.
Eor exami)le, a man of science observes ])henomena and tries
to explain them. This means that he has formed a theory. Ihit if
he is trul}' scientific, he will realize and insist that his theor\- is
provisional, tentative, subject to modification or even reiection
after further observation and ex[)eriment. In that case there is no
error. Likewise, when a person is aware of his limitations, his
ignorance, he will c|ualify his statements and remain open-minded.
He will saw "I am inclined to believe," not "T believe." He will not
claim convictions when he has only notions or of)inions based on
slender data.
Croce, if I understand him. contends that the a\-oi(lance of errcjrs
and mistakes is a matter of literarv stvle, and that the true scientist
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can have no difficulty in expressing himself with i)recision and cau-
tion. Rashness, dogmatism, looseness of statement, vanitw pretence
and the like are, of course, moral, not mental, c|ualities. Hence
Croce's conclusion—so odd when not analyzed and correctly in-
terpreted—that error is moral, not intellectual.
This question is raised again by Abbe Ernest Dimnet, the French
critic and teacher, in his little book on The Art of Thinkiut/. His
conclusions are not dififerent from those of Graham \\'allas, but he
is less direct, less exact, less didactic. Me is interested, he sa}s, in
producing thought, not in guiding it. Wallas was interested in
improving the quality of much current thought. Both agree that
the obstacles to real thinking are man\-, and the wonder is that we
manage to think as well as we do. llut who would dis])Ute the
proposition that, if it be possible to i)roduce l)etter thought and more
thought of the right kind, it is our duty to em])]oy whatever means
are available for the promotion of that end ?
For, as ~Sl. Dimnet says, the question is at bottom a moral one
—
namel\', the making of the fullest and worthiest use of all our
faculties. The ciuestion is individual, primarily, but it is also social.
Waste of pow-er and facult\' is reprehensible, and the victims of
such waste are often the victims of social maladjustment, bad edu-
cational methods, group blunders and false standards. If schools
and colleges do not teach the art of thinking, they neglect their
primary and most important purpose, h'acts are onl_\' the raw-
material of thought, and obviousl\' to interpret them aright, to
arrive at h\potheses and theories, or at laws, thinking is necessary.
How, then, can we teach thinking? Wallas divided the process
of thought into four distinct stages, and stressed the importance of
adequate preparation, of time for incubation and the proper utiliza-
tion of illumination. M. Dimnet passes oxer this suggestive division
and deals more generally with the problem.
He tirst points out the obstacles to thought—Wallas would say
to correct and sound thinking. What are they ? Dimnet gives
(|uite a list of obstacles
—
passion, to begin with, naturally, which is
another name for bias or prejudice, and then imitation, gregarious-
ness, indolence, wrong ideas of education, lack of leisure or of time
for reflection and the cultivation of the pleasures of the intellect.
Can these obstacles be avoided? Xot entirely, i)erhaps, but most
of those who are endowed with the capacity for thought—with
brains, in short—and with a certain amount of intellectual integrit\-
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and seriousness can avoid most of the (obstacles imder ordinary
circumstances h\' observing certain conditions and ebminating olher
conditions.
What must we do to enable our minds to think correcll) .' I
confess I am not entirel}' satisfied with the way in which M . Dimnet
answers the question. He omits vital elements and is rather \ague
in his answer, though all that he says is true and helpful.
Those who would teach men to think and to a\"oid error should
lay particular stress on the dut\' of fitting one's-self to form an
opinion on a gi\en subject. \\ hat value is there in an opinion based
on no facts, no knowledge? And how can there be much \alue in
an opinion based on very little and ill-assimilated knowledge? The
trouble with most men. especiall}' in the realm of the inexact
sciences, is that thev form and express ()[)inions without half the
knowledge that would give them the r'uiht to opinions, and that thex'
refuse to modify their notions even if the e\idence against them is
overwhelming. Further, the tr(nible with most men is that the\'
are too vain and proud to be intellectually honest. He who would
reason scientificall}' must be humble, ready to change his mind, or
to suspend judgment, or to consider with s_\-mpath\' the arguments
of opponents.
But to return to ]\I. Dimnet. A\ hat are his conditions of
thought? He names and discusses several. He emphasizes the
trustworthiness of intuitions, of flashes, of inspirations, agreeing in
this with Bergson. He advises leisurely contemplation. He insists
on the reading of the best books and on li\-ing with the great and
their noble and elevated ideas. He urges culti\ation of one's own
vein, after determining what that vein is. He deprecates the
tendency to rush into print. He believes, as does \\ alias in incuba-
tion and illumination after due preparation, and also in verification.
Since the little book is distinctly literar}-, rhetorical and con-
versational, it has the defects of its good qualities— it is occasionally
superficial and paradoxical. But these faults may be passed over.
It. is bound to stimulate thought and direct attention to the sources
of error, the vices of intolerant and dogmatic writers, the bad habits
of the generality of men who regard themselves as civilized and
superior, and the road to truth and high-minded thinking.
The Wallas and Dimnet books should be studied in every high
school, college, university and institute of the world. They are more
valuable than text-books on logic, or, rather, they are excellent text-
books on logic among other things.
